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LIABILITY WITHOUT FAULT: LOGIC AND POTENTIAL
OF A DEVELOPING CONCEPT
I. INTRODUCTION
The imposition of criminal liability for an unlawful act without
a required showing of mental state (often termed "strict liability"
or "liability without fault") has been resorted to increasingly in the
last 70 years.' In the broad context of the historical development
of criminal liability, in which emphasis has been placed on moral
blameworthiness, liability without fault has been viewed alter-
nately as an illogical development 2 or as distinguishable in theory
from the "true crimes of the classic law."' 3 This comment will dem-
onstrate that, whatever may be one's emotional response to liability
without fault, a rational and logical analysis of criminal liability
can be made which accepts the imposition of criminal liability
without a showing of fault. Given an analysis which accepts crim-
inal liability without fault, the inquiry becomes: (1) whether a
jurisdiction (e.g., Wisconsin) has laid the logical foundation for such
a model in statute and case law; (2) what consequences would flow
from a completed model; and, (3) what forces might produce or
inhibit full implementation of the model.
An analysis of the current state of liability without fault is com-
plicated by the difficulty of determining in which instances the leg-
islature has adopted that standard. Data gathered for Wisconsin
from the 1953 statutes indicated that the language of over one-half
of Wisconsin's criminal statutes did not express a requirement of
fault.4 Remington and Halstead attribute the difficulty thus cre-
ated in large part to the almost complete lack of attention given the
problem by draftsmen. 5 Since a clear delineation of alternatives is
necessary before a cohesive legislative response can be expected,
6
this analysis hopes to provide some of the clarity which~may induce
legislative response.
1 Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 56 n.5 (1933).
2 Binavince, The Ethical Foundation of Criminal Liability, 33 FORDHAM
L. RE V. 1 (1964).
3 Sayre, supra note 1, at 67.
4 Remington, Liability without Fault Criminal Statutes-Their Rela-
tion to Major Developments in Contemporary Economic and Social Policy:
The Situation in Wisconsin, 1956 Wis. L. REV. 625 (summarized data gathered
under a research grant from the Rockefeller Foundation). There is no
indication that current statutes differ greatly in their use of a fault re-
quirement, though only a similar detailed study would accurately reflect
current use.
5 Remington & Halstead, The Mental Element in Crime-A Legislative
Problem, 1952 Wis. L. REV. 644, 648.
6 Id. at 648 recognizes this need as concommitant with the need for
greater legislative concern.
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II. LIABILITY WITHOUT FAULT ANALYZED
A discussion of the appropriate role of a mental element in the
imposition of criminal liability, that is, the possibility of imposing a
penalty absent any showing of mental state, is effective only in the
context of the historical development of the mental element in
crime. Numerous discussions provide extensive historical detail,7
but the broad outlines, on which some modicum of agreement ex-
ists, will be most useful here.
A. Historical Context
Sayre concludes that prior to the 12th century the requirement
of a certain mental state, in anything like its modern sense, was
nonexistent.8 However, the absence of a mental element as a gen-
eral requisite of criminality in the old records does not necessarily
mean that it was disregarded entirely. The very nature of the ma-
jority of the early offenses rendered commission without criminal
intent impossible.9 Whether or not the mental element was consid-
ered in determining guilt, it was an important factor in determining
the appropriate punishment.
The beginning of an ordered concept of required mental state is
largely attributed to two 12th century influences: Roman law,
which was receiving considerable attention in the universities; and
canon law, with its emphasis on moral guilt. Under the influence
of the church's teaching in England that punishment should be de-
pendent on moral guilt, the mental element necessary for criminal
liability came to the fore in prosecution. "By the second half of the
seventeenth century, it was universally accepted law that an evil
intent was as necessary for felony as the act itself."'10 Despite the
emphasis on mental state, punishment probably was not extended
beyond instances in which the mental state was manifested in some
act."
7 3 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 433-46 (4th ed. 1926);
Binavince, supra note 2; Chesney, The Concept of Mens Rea in the Criminal
Law, 29 J. CR. L. & CrM. 627 (1939); Levitt, The Origin of the Doctrine of
Mens Rea, 17 ILL. L. REV. 117 (1922); Turner, The Mental Element in Crimes
at Common Law, 6 CAMB. L.J. 31 (1936).
8 Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 981 (1932).
9 Waylaying, robbery, and rape are impossible without criminal in-
tent. House burning might be the result of intent or negligence, but from
the earliest record the felony of arson depended on proof of intent to burn.
10 Sayre, supra note 8, at 993.
11 That "the will might be taken for the deed" appeared in English
canonists' writings. STAUNFORD, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 27 (1557), asserted
that in the time of Edward III the doctrine was applied to robbery and
several other crimes. Sayre, supra note 8, at 992, concludes that no such
doctrine existed in the practicing criminal system but notes that recurrent
reference to the maxim indicates the strong movement after the 13th century
to making intent the primary element of criminal responsibility.
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Particularization of the general mental element with respect to
specific felonies followed. Since each felony touched different so-
cial and public interests, and thus served a different function, the
mental elements came to differ from one another. 12 In this way the
concept of mens rea, a general mental element necessary to convict
for any crime, gave way to a new theory of mentes reae. The
range of mental states involved in the imposition of criminal liabil-
ity could then run from specific intent, through general subjective
awareness, to an objective standard which all must meet at their
peril.
13
Largely within the last 75 years, the range has been extended at
the one extreme to include the imposition of criminal liability re-
gardless of the actor's state of mind,1 4 with application to some pol-
icy offenses and criminal nuisances in which only light penalties
are imposed. 15 A broad view of the historical development of the
mental element of crime supports this liability without fault concept
as the logical conclusion of a shift of emphasis in the objectives of
the law.16
The literature of various disciplines is in accord that a shift of
emphasis in the 20th century has moved the focus of law from the
protection of individual interests, which marked the 19th century
criminal administration, to the protection of public and social inter-
ests.
Our modern objective [of criminal justice] tends more and
more in the direction, not of awarding adequate punishment
for moral wrongdoing, but of protecting social and public
interests. . . .As the underlying objective of criminal ad-
ministration has almost unconsciously shifted, and is shift-
12 Sayre, supra note 8, at 994.
13 Binavince, supra note 2, at 34, detailed the shift between subjective
and objective liability:
The major problem of criminal law theory is the determination of
the basic ethical principal in reference to which the fundamental
element of crime should be defined. The history of criminal law,
like the growth of our moral consciousness, shows two relevant
postulates in characterizing crime, either in reference to the external
conduct and its material consequences, or the subjective elements
that control or direct the conduct.
14 The extension is operationally described by HOLMES, THE COMMON
LAW 50-51 (1881):
[The standards enforced by the criminal law] are not only external,
..but they are of general application. They do not merely require
that every man should get as near as he can to the best conduct
possible for him. They require him at his own peril to come up to
a certain height. They take no account of his incapacities, unless
the weakness is so marked as to fall into well-known exceptions,
such as infancy or madness. They assume that every man is as able
as every other to behave as they command.
15 Sayre, supra note 1, at 56, denotes these as "public welfare offenses."
Sayre argues that the range of acts which produce liability without fault
should be sharply limited to police offenses of a merely regulatory nature
with light monetary fines as a penalty.
16 WEBsTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIONARY (1961): "objective-
something toward which effort is directed: an aim or end of action ...
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ing, the basis of the requisite mens rea has imperceptibly
shifted, lending a change to the flavor, if not to the actual
content, of the criminal state of mind which must be proved
to convict.
17
Initially, the industrial revolution may be credited with the shift.
Proof of fault became difficult as technical regulation increased.
The New Deal and the subsequent development of the service
state focused increasing attention on the larger public interest.'8
Selznick noted the shift to protection of public and social interests
as a third "master trend" in the American legal system-"the as-
cendance of social interests over parochial interests"-subordinat-
ing the concept of abstract individually held rights to consideration
of the general welfare.1 9 Discussions of the American Philosophical
Society 20 were premised on the thought that the form, content, and
overall purpose of the law result from the values, obligations, and
rights of the people which first relate to their common needs.
B. Assumptions
If the shift in the focus of the law from the protection of individ-
ual interests to the protection of public and social interests is taken
as explaining the appearance and development of liability without
fault, the assumptions which are believed to follow therefrom
should be clearly articulated. After being stated, the assumptions
of this explanation can be used to answer objections raised to the
extension of liability without fault to the criminal law.
(1) A means-end relationship is the source of law's
obligation. Legal obligation has been viewed variously as
having a natural existence to be "discovered," as existing
to impose a sovereign's scheme of duties and morals on his
people, and as a manifestation of divine will. More realis-
tically, the legislative process in creating legal obligations
reacts to the pressure of particular problems (ends). Thus,
a means-ends necessity precedes law.
(2) Given as an end the protection of certain public and
social interests, the choice of means is the variable for con-
the purpose to be satisfied." Objectives of the law, by definition, guide its
development. The term is a summary of the forces or ideas pressuring
development in some direction. When the forces are altered there is a
concommitant change in the objective.
17 Sayre, supra note 8, at 1017.
18 See S. MORISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 987
(1965) (as to the New Deal). On the welfare or service state see Address by
Roscoe Pound, Economic and Business Foundation and the Service and
Professional Clubs at New Castle, Pa., June 13, 1949, in GREAT POLITICAL
THINKERS 832 (W. Eberstein ed., 3rd ed. 1966).
19 Selznick, Sociology of Law, Paper prepared for the International
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Berkeley, Cal., April 1965, at 50, 57.






(3) The potential range of means appropriate to further-
ing the end of public and social interests may be the oppo-
site of that when primary emphasis is on individual inter-
ests. Elimination of any showing of mental state may most
effectively meet public and social needs. A required show-
ing of specific intent promotes individual interests.
(4) An unfettered selection from a range of means is
essential to produce laws responsive to changing concep-
tions of common need. The effectiveness of any model of
criminal liability which accepts liability without fault as an
alternative is its ability to move within a range of means
as the ends require, rather than being theoretically tied to
requirements of mental state. Likewise, there should be
no commitment to impose liability without fault in every
instance, for that would be as restrictive as requiring proof
of mental state in every instance.
C. Objections Considered
The assumptions which follow from a historical analysis of lia-
bility without fault as a logical development of the increasing em-
phasis in the law on protection of public and social interests provide
the basis upon which objections to liability without fault can be
considered and the sources of its support summarized.
1. LOGIC
The extension to liability without fault, especially if viewed as
an imposition on the criminal law, is often discounted as illogical.
Hall found the earlier extension to criminal negligence equally ob-
jectionable-"the inclusion of negligence [for criminal liability]
bars the discovery of a scientific theory of penal law, i.e., a system
of propositions interrelating variables that have a realistic founda-
tion in fact and values.' '22 Sayre's underlying premise is that lia-
bility without fault does not play a legitimate part in completing
the range of criminal liability. He rejects the idea that the exten-
sion to liability without fault developed from within the criminal
system in response to appropriate concerns of criminal theory, and
views it instead as an imposition on the operating machinery of the
criminal system.23 Likewise, Binavince concluded, after consider-
21 The regulations which are law should be concerned only with the
values which relate proximately to the common needs. The values
which pertain first and foremost to their individual needs and refer
only remotely to common needs should not become part of the con-
tent of the law.
Id. at 23.
22 Hall, Negligent Behavior should be Excluded from Penal Liability,
63 COLUM. L. REv. 632, 643 (1963). The same objection, if valid, would
apply to liability without any showing of fault.
23 This view is illustrated by his Comment, supra note 1, at 68:
[G]rowing complexities of twentieth century life have demanded
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ing the German experience during the Third Reich, that "[i] n Eng-
land and the United States, the considerable extension of the doc-
trine of strict liability is posing a serious threat to the rational
foundation of criminal liability. ... 1
This criticism assumes that the objectives of the criminal law are
static. It is here assumed that the objectives have not been static,
and that in fact it is a change in objective which has brought about
a growing use of liability without fault. Objections to the logic of
imposing liability without fault to be valid, should be directed first
to the fundamental shift in objective, rather than solely to the re-
sulting choice of means to attain the objective.
2. CULPABILITY
Culpability has been considered essential for ethical soundness
in a system generally requiring a showing of mental state. 25 It is
generally evidenced, to the degree required by the particular stat-
ute, by proof of mental state.
The argument that culpability is essential to a criminal law sys-
tem does not defeat a model capable of imposing liability without
a showing of mental state. Rather than dispensing with the concept
of culpability, the more recent trend toward emphasis on public and
social interests lays a broader basis for its definition. What be-
comes wrongful is not only the intentional infliction of harm, or
negligent failure to avoid harm, but also a failure to meet an active
and affirmative duty to protect public interests.
The showing of mental state has a utilitarian aspect which the
imposition of liability without fault can also be made to serve. It
has been argued that deterrence (i.e., preventing individuals from
committing criminal acts) is effective only when the individual
contemplates the act and has a period of time in which he can de-
cide that the act should not be committed.
The theory of deterrence rests on the premise of rational
utility, i.e. that prospective offenders will weigh the evil
an increasing social regulation; and for this purpose the existing
machinery of the criminal law has been seized upon and utilized."
(emphasis added)
24 Binavince, supra note 2, at 1. The reference to Germany arises from
Hitler's reduction of. criminal penalty to what Binavince terms a morally
indifferent "security measure," thereby making many innocent people
criminals.
25 Acimovic, Conceptions of Culpability in Contemporary American
Criminal Law, 26 LA. L. REv. 28, 37 (1965), insists that, "The general princi-
ple of the criminal law should always be that there can be no criminal of-
fense without culpability." Sayre, supra note 1, at 79-80, concurs:
When the law begins to permit convictions for serious offenses of
men who are morally innocent and free from fault, who may even be
respected and useful members of the community, its restraining
power becomes undermined. Once it becomes respectable to be con-
victed, the vitality of the criminal law has been sapped.
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of the sanction against the gain of the imagined crime.
This, however, is not relevant to negligent harm-doers (or
a strict liability harm-doer), since they have not in the least
thought of their duty, their dangerous behavior, or any
sanction. Insofar as potential offenders do think of these
matters, they are at least reckless when they act danger-
ously.
26
Such a view, while valid as to the nature of negligent wrongdoing,
is restrictively framed because of the focus on the individual. While
the individual committing an illegal act with specific intent and a
clearly wrongful motive is admittedly the one most likely to be de-
terred by considering the consequences, the imposition of a positive
and high duty of care on the public can achieve a degree of positive
deterrence if individuals are made aware that they are expected,
on pain of criminal liability, to meet this standard.27 Thus, from
this point of view, the imposition of liability without fault serves
to create a positive duty of care in the individual, a means consistent
with the end of protecting public and social interests.
3. POTENTIAL UNFAIRNESS TO THE INDIVIDUAL
A criminal system, when it utilizes liability without fault, is ex-
plicitly public oriented. Public interests are given higher priority
than those of the individual defendant. The effect will be harsh if
the legislature fails to impose penalties based on potential for
harm28 and if in fact a defendant is unable with care to avoid the
harm for which liability is imposed. Harshness will be less of a po-
tential weakness in the model when the means selected by the leg-
islature are tailored to the reasonable accomplishment of the end.
Imposition of strict liability would therefore be fair in two in-
stances: (1) where a degree of care can in fact always prevent
a particular harm; and (2) where there is a margin of factual cir-
cumstances in which the harm cannot be avoided, but the potential
harm in all instances is great and imposition of liability without
fault alone induces care sufficient to prevent the harm in most in-
stances. If liability without fault is imposed by broadly worded
statutes it is more likely to produce harsh results than if the tech-
nique is specifically applied to narrower ends. Like any other
model of liability, this one is subject to weaknesses inherent in the
legislative process.
26 Hall, supra note 22, at 641.
27 In tort the imposition of an affirmative duty is not uncommon in
the law of European nations.
28 Eser, The Principle of "Harm" in the Concept of Crime: A Com-




D. Sources of Support
Cohn's operational analysis of response to crime provides a frame-
work in which to summarize the sources of support for a system of
criminal liability which includes liability without fault as a viable
alternative. He divides the evolution of criminal liability into three
broad stages, each of which continues to have force, though muted
by subsequent development.
This challenge, which is presented by a crime, strikes si-
multaneously the keys of several levels, each of which
produces a reaction of its own; the deepest level sounds of
dull opposition against the deed and its consequences; the
higher level of passionate indignation against guilt or in-
justice, because the free will of the actor is assumed; the
third level calls attention to a rational search for means of
dealing with the case purposefully to avoid a recurrence.
These disparate modes of the reaction struggle in the con-
sciousness to gain predominance in the final integral result.
Each reaction forms its own objectives according to the as-
sumptions which it makes.
29
Imposition of liability without fault is capable of attaining the sup-
port of each of these "disparate modes of reaction." The initial
opposition to the deed and its consequences inheres in any crime.
Emphasis on the consequences is especially consistent with a model
developing penalties on the basis of potential harm, divorced from
questions of moral fault. The secondary indignation against guilt
or injustice is not lost if injustice is viewed in the broader sense as
failure to meet an affirmative duty to protect public interests. Ra-
tional disposal from the point of pragmatic utility most strongly
supports a model which moves beyond prohibiting certain acts, and
in effect imposes an affirmative duty of care.
I LIABILITY WITHOUT FAULT IN WISCONSIN
It is necessary to work at two levels to determine the present use
of, and potential for, liability without fault in Wisconsin: (1) cur-
rent reasoning which is consistent with imposition of liability with-
out fault; and (2) existent statements about liability without fault
applicable in a criminal law context.
A. Sources
An analysis of the Wisconsin Statutes to determine the extent to
which the Wisconsin Legislature may have moved away from re-
quiring a specific mental state is beyond the scope of this comment.
As indicated by the 1956 study of Wisconsin Statutes, the great bulk
of the statutes do not, on their face, make clear what mental state
must be proved.3 0 When some mental state is described the lan-
29 G. COHN, EXISTENTIALISM AND LEGAL SCIENCE 127 (1967).
30 Remington, supra note 4, at 625.
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guage is so varied that comparison between statutes is not pos-
sible.Y1 Nor are legislative records available to clarify the intent
behind the words.
Conclusions drawn from statutory changes then are generally
negative in nature, derived from the initial absence or subsequent
deletion of fault language. 32 More positive indications can be
drawn from the opinions of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. While
Remington concludes that "[c]ourts cannot deal effectively with
the problem [lack of clarity as to mental state in statutes] since
they are not called upon to interpret the large percentage of crim-
inal statutes, '33 the fact remains that the court is the ultimate ar-
biter of challenged legislative product. While it cannot provide an
overall remedial solution, it is in the position to block a trend to-
ward liability without fault. Thus, inability to delineate from stat-
utes the direction in which the legislature has moved may be par-
tially offset by the assumption that a judicial response will reflect
at least the more extreme legislative or administrative movements
toward liability without fault.
B. Analogous Reasoning
Modes of reasoning consistent with the rationale required to sup-
port liability without fault are most pronounced in the evidentiary
presumption that one intends the natural and probable conse-
quences of his acts and in the objective standard for criminal negli-
gence.
1. PRESUMPTION OF INTENT FOR NATURAL AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES
The presumption that one intends the natural and probable con-
sequences of his act is the method that has developed for handling
the difficult problem of proof of intent.34 It can, in effect, go fur-
ther and impose a duty on the defendant not to act if he cannot
prove that harmful consequences were unintended. Practically
31 Id. at 635, lists these variations: "intentionally, with intent, intended
to, willfully, wilful, knowingly, maliciously, fraudulently, corruptly."
32 See Comment, Liability Without Fault in the Food and Drug Statutes,
1956 Wis. L. REV. 641, 644-45:
The years from 1911 to the present saw a continuing elimination by
amendment and repeal of express fault requirements, until today, as
we noted earlier, only two provisions containing such requirements
remain. At the same time the area of regulation expanded. Chapter
97 of the 1953 Wisconsin Statutes alone comprises sixty sections.
If the subsequent change includes a general rewording it may be difficult
to tell whether a change in fault requirement was intentional or inad-
vertent. The latter is not unlikely when you deal with a complex concept
with a number of seemingly interchangeable terms available.
33 Remington, supra note 4, at 625.
34 By its very nature as a presumption it is rebuttable: Welch v.
State, 145 Wis. 86, 129 N.W. 656 (1911); State v. Vinson, 269 Wis. 305, 68
N.W.2d 712 (1955); State v. Carlson, 5 Wis. 2d 595, 93 N.W.2d 354 (1958).
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speaking this imposition is not small, for cases have narrowed the
possibilities for rebutting the presumption.
a. As the result of Hobbins v. State,8 5 a defendant is not exempt
from criminal responsibility because he considered the act not to be
wrong. If wrong is taken as turning on harm, then the belief that
an act is not wrong would seem to be relevant to whether or not
harm was intended. When the court refuses to consider defendant's
belief in right or wrong it presumes that belief in correctness of an
act cannot negate intent of harmful consequences.
b. Once found wilful, a Blue Sky Law violation in Boyd v.
State8 6 was presumed intentional. The court held that "the intent
he entertained when he committed the acts, other than an intent not
to commit them, cannot excuse his violation of the statute." (em-
phasis added) This language sharply increases the burden placed
on a defendant once it is found that the act was wilful. While the
defendant might occasionally be able to prove he intended a differ-
ent consequence than that which occurred, only rarely could he
prove that what he intended at the time of the act was not to do
the act.
c. A portion of the proof required in a nonsupport case is sup-
plied by a statutory presumption that proof of desertion is prima
facie proof of wilfulness. 37 In State v. Frieberg,8  this presumption
was held to establish wilfulness beyond a reasonable doubt if all
the other elements of the crime have been proved. Not only is the
state relieved of the burden of proving wilfulness but the defendant
must counter as though full proof had been entered against him on
the issue of wilfulness.
d. State v. McCarter0 effectively illustrates the presumption in
action. Defendant shot his wife in a struggle with her father but
claimed he had only come to frighten her. Though defendant said
he remembered nothing because he had been drinking heavily, the
court found this insufficient to rebut the presumption. It did not
negative the existence of a state of mind essential to the crime.40
While rephrasing the law to read that one who kills another with-
out justification is liable to punishment might be more logical, the
route of requiring a showing of intent and then imposing a pre-
sumption regarding the existence of this intent, rebuttable in theory
but less often in practice, achieves much the same result.
2. THE REASONABLE MAN STANDARD FOR NEGLIGENCE
The use of the objective standard of the reasonable man is con-
sistent in reasoning with the imposition of liability without fault.
85 214 Wis. 496, 505, 253 N.W. 570, 574 (1934).
30 217 Wis. 149, 163, 258 N.W. 330, 335 (1935).
37 WIs. STAT. § 52.05(6) (1967).
38 35 Wis. 2d 480, 483, 151 N.W.2d 1, 2 (1967).
39 36 Wis. 2d 608, 153 N.W.2d 527 (1967).
40 WIS. STAT. § 939.42(2) (1967).
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The difference is in the degree of diligence required; the ordinary
reasonable man is not viewed as perfect, or as assuming an extra
duty of watchfulness, but rather as being his ordinary careful self.
An absolute standard imposes an affirmative duty of diligence, even
on the reasonable man-a degree of diligence strict enough so that
harmful consequences will not occur.
Objective liability presently appears in two relatively narrow
areas. Section 940.08 of the Wisconsin Statutes imposes liability on
whoever causes the death of another by a high degree of negligence
in the operation of a vehicle or certain listed weapons. A "high de-
gree of negligence" is defined as an act which the person should
realize creates a situation of unreasonable risk and high probability
of death or great bodily harm to another. The objective standard
is retained but a more serious risk must be created. Section 940.09
calls for a showing of causal negligence for death caused by an in-
toxicated individual in the operation of a vehicle or firearm.
Though there is no clear instance of imposing criminal liability
for ordinary negligence, the fact that an objective standard was
chosen for statutes where dangers to the public from drunk and
negligent users of vehicles and weapons were involved, reveals an
amiability toward the concept.
C. Specific Application
Liability without fault has been applied in "regulatory criminal
statutes" outside the Criminal Code.4 1 This application seems to
recognize the utilitarian value of liability without fault. The court
in State v. Dried Milk Products Co-operative,42 when considering
highway weight limit violations, faced squarely the effect to be
given a statute not clearly requiring intent.
Statutes of this nature, imposing criminal penalty irrespec-
tive of any intent to violate them, have for their purpose
the requirement of a degree of diligence for the protection
of the public which shall render a violation thereof im-
possible.
In City of West Allis v. Megna,43 absolute liability for the presence
of a minor on premises licensed for sale of liquor was upheld-"this
is a price that the operator pays for the privilege of becoming li-
41 Platz, The Criminal Code, 1956 Wis. L. REv. 350, 357:
The code . . .is by no means all the criminal law of the state.
Many criminal laws-in fact the numerical majority and the quan-
titative bulk of them-are to be found scattered through the re-
mainder of the statutes.
Roughly, these extra-code laws may be regarded as "regulatory"
-statutes which regulate conduct which is not always essentially
bad, or at least is tolerated under controlled conditions.
42 16 Wis. 2d 357, 362, 114 N.W.2d 252, 254 (1963).
43 26 Wis. 2d 545, 548, 133 N.W.2d 252, 254 (1963).
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censed." According to the court, the law44 was designed simply to
prevent minors as patrons or customers from entering taverns.
Within the Criminal Code there has been some movement by the
court, though more in discussion than holding. That a requirement
of mens rea is not constitutionally essential clearly appears. Most
recently in Roberts v. State,45 the court, in considering a first de-
gree murder and burglary conviction with a defense of intoxica-
tion, adopted the conclusion of the United States Supreme Court in
Powell v. Texas.
46
IT]he court went on to state it had "never articulated a
general constitutional doctrine of mens rea." Consequently
a state can create a crime which does not contain a mens
rea as an element.
Again in relation to a code conviction, the court concluded in State
ex rel. Schulter v. Roraff4 7 that as to the increased penalty result-
ing from contribution to the delinquency of a minor which leads
to the minor's death,48 "forseeability or intent that the specific con-
sequences occur are not necessary to due process or to a crime."
The tendency, however, is to construe criminal statutes so as to
require a showing of intent. Thus, in State v. Alfonsi,49 after not-
ing that "the element of scienter is the rule rather than the excep-
tion in our criminal jurisprudence," the court concluded that the
statute on bribery,50 which had previously included a requirement
of "corrupt acceptance" by the person taking the bribe, did not lose
that "flavor of wickedness" when the term "corrupt" was omitted
in the 1953 revision of the Criminal Code. It found no indication in
the judiciary committee report of a desire to change the require-
ment of criminal intent, and concluded that for bribery a corrupt
motivation is still required.
The Hallows' dissent in Alfonsi5 1 recognized the possibility of re-
moving the requirement of a criminal or corrupt intent. Noting the
increasing use of nonfault liability, he observed that it was no "ma-
jor upheaval" or "cataclysmic alteration" to create a crime without
fault. As to statutory construction he was explicit:
Whenever the code intends a crime to include a specific
criminal intent, it so provides or exact language is used
which comes under sec. 939.23, Stats., which defines when
intent is an element .... 52
44 WEST ALLIS MUN. CODE § 9.02(20) (c), modeled on WIs. STAT. § 176.32
(1) (1965).
45 41 Wis. 2d 537, 545, 164 N.W.2d 525, 528 (1968).
46 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
47 39 Wis. 2d 342, 355, 159 N.W.2d 25, 32 (1967).
48 WIS. STAT. § 947.15 (1967).
49 33 Wis. 2d 469, 476, 147 N.W.2d 550, 555 (1966).
50 WIS. STAT. § 946.10 (1965).
51 33 Wis. 2d at 485, 147 N.W.2d at 559.
52 Id. at 486, 147 N.W.2d at 560.
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This dissent provides a channel into the Criminal Code consistent
with language in previous noncode cases.
Though statutes without a fault requirement clearly are possible,
a limitation must be noted which is essential to avoid arbitrariness
in operation. The statute must meet a standard of definiteness so
as to give adequate notice. In Day-Bergwall Company v. State,
53
the defendant, who was accused of violating the pure food laws,
claimed that "it is a basic rule that a criminal statute should be so
definite and certain that a defendant can know absolutely in ad-
vance whether or not a certain act will constitute a violation of the
law." The court admitted that:
This quotation is a proper exposition of the legal principal
contended for, and has been substantially approved by the
courts and by the law writers . . . . They [the laws in-
volved] should, therefore, be reasonably definite, and
should not require a defendant to enter into the realm of
speculation to determine whether he is or is not commit-
ting an offense.1
4
The concept of what is required in terms of notice has been gradu-
ally narrowed.
In the context of negligence in the operation of a vehicle, the
court in State ex rel. Zent v. Yanny 55 attacked the idea that one has
a right to know how much harm he could do without becoming li-
able.
It is not necessary that the law be so definite that the of-
fending operator of a vehicle may know with certainty
just how negligent he may be in causing the death of an-
other person before he becomes criminally liable under
the negligent homicide statute. (cite omitted) No operator
of a vehicle has a legal right to be negligent in any de-
gree.5
6
State v. Evjue5 7 stands for the proposition that there must be
sufficient warning to one bent on obedience that he comes near the
proscribed area. However, some diligence is required of the indi-
vidual; that is, only when one is bent on obedience does the notice
requirement fully arise.
In construing a disorderly conduct statute with a catch-all
phrase58 in State v. Givens,59 the court made clear that a statute
does not fail for vagueness because it does not itemize with partic-
ularity every possible kind of conduct which would violate it.
53 190 Wis. 8, 18,.207 N.W. 959, 963 (1926).
54 Id.
55 244 Wis. 342, 12 N.W.2d 45 (1943).
56 Id. at 346, 12 N.W.2d at 47.
57 253 Wis. 146, 159, 33 N.W.2d 305, 311 (1948).
58 WIS. STAT. § 947.01(1) (1963).
59 28 Wis. 2d 109, 115, 135 N.W.2d 780, 784 (1964).
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Thus, it seems that one bent on obedience must still draw some
conclusions as to what is prohibited.
The basis in reasoning for growth in the application of liability
without fault exists in Wisconsin. The means-ends nexus has been
clearly recognized and the effectiveness of casting an affirmative
duty admitted. Limited objective liability is established within the
Criminal Code, and more extensively in other statutes. The dissent
in Alfonsi acknowledges the possibility of clear nonfault liability
within the code, numerous cases acknowledge it outside the Code,
and the limiting element of notice to potential violators is relatively
narrow.
IV. CONSEQUENCES AND LIMITATIONS
The above discussion recognizes more the potential of the criminal
law system than actual movement within the system, which occurs
subtly and often without enunciation. As to prediction of future
developments, the most that can be done is to point out the forces
which would move the system in one direction or another.
That force which will increase reliance on nonfault statutes is a
public perception that it is threatened in a way that requires drastic
response. Such a perception may appear in the recent concern
about "law and order" and the rise of the crime rate. Schur de-
scribes what he believes to be the representative view of a signif-
icant body of public opinion.
[I] t is sometimes asserted that we are a nation of criminals,
that American society is vitally menaced by an unprece-
dented tendency to "lawlessness", that we are experiencing
a truly alarming and ever-increasing "wave" of criminal
behavior, behavior that foreshadows the decline of civilized
life in the United States and that demands stern action to
"stem the tide".0
Herbert Wechsler has concluded that "the law promotes the general
security by building confidence that those whose conduct does not
warrant condemnation will not be convicted of a crime."0' Under
a perception of a general threat to security by a wave of lawless-
ness, the general security may rather be protected only by the as-
surance that "you will not be hurt." Liability without fault, with
its imposition of an affirmative duty, might appeal to people who
feel threatened as offering comprehensive protection.
The vulnerability of any system of criminal liability which relies
on liability without fault is that it assumes a rational public choos-
ing its means to meet the end of protection of the public. While
the possibility of imposing liability without fault is desirable for
60 E. SCHUR, OUR CRIMINAL SOCIETY 12 (1969).
61 Wechsler, Codification of Criminal Law in the United States: The
Model Penal Code, 68 COLUM. L. Rsv. 1425, 1435 (1968).
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responsiveness to needs, the formulation of those needs must be
carefully accomplished. Likewise, determination of penalties based
on potential for harm must be accurately and realistically accom-
plished. If the penalty is not consistent with harm the imposition
on the defendant would outweigh the public interest in imposing
the penalty.
The major limitation on the acceptance of liability without fault
is the ethical commitment to a requirement of culpability, and the
lack of desire to modify the concept of culpability to include failure
to meet a high affirmative public duty. The Model Penal Code
directly rejects imposition of liability without fault and creates a
grade of offense called a violation (fine or forfeiture or other civil
penalty only) which does not constitute a crime. 62 If such an ap-
proach is adopted in a jurisdiction, it may well remove the basis in
reasoning for a completed model including more extensive use of
liability without fault.
V. CONCLUSION
The objectives of the criminal law have largely moved from con-
cern for the individual to concern for public and social interests.
The growth of liability without fault has followed that shift and
can be imposed within a rational and logical model. Liability with-
out fault cannot be discounted as merely an imposition on the true
criminal law and not an extension to be dealt with. A model which
accepts liability without fault as an alternative is advantageous in
its flexibility and response to needs. It is vulnerable to the abuse
of those in position to perceive and promote the appropriate ends
to be met. Current emphasis on moral culpability has a certain
amount of inertia to it. Rearticulation of culpability occurs very
slowly. A model which accepts liability without fault is highly
plastic. If the basis in reasoning has been laid for such a model, as
it arguably has in Wisconsin, careful consideration is due to the
means most appropriate to the range of ends promoting the public
interest, and to the processes by which the means shall be selected.
JANET S. HARRING
62 Id. at 1439.
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